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Toward a More Effective Drug Policy
Mathea Falcot
Although drug abuse is no longer front page news, America's
drug problem is still very real. In 1992, the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget estimated that drug abuse cost the nation $300
billion annually in lost productivity, crime, health care, and acci-
dents.' Seventy-four million Americans acknowledge using illegal
drugs; six million are believed to be so seriously addicted they
require treatment.2 As many as 375,000 babies are born exposed
every year; many of them are permanently damaged by their
mothers' drug use.' If tobacco and alcohol are included as drugs
of abuse, the toll is even greater. Together, they account for
490,000 deaths annually, and untold suffering for the users and
their families.4 In an October 1993 report, the Institute for
Health Policy at Brandeis University concluded that substance
abuse is the single largest preventable cause of death in this
country.'
In the past decade, drug offenses have overwhelmed the
criminal justice system. At present, approximately 1.3 million
people are behind bars, giving the United States the highest rate
of incarceration in the world.6 Two-thirds of these prisoners have
serious drug problems, confirmed by urinalysis testing at the
time of arrest.7 Violent crime has jumped by 19 percent since
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1988; at least one-third of the increase is attributed to drugs and
alcohol.' The recent surge in gun deaths in cities across America
is closely linked to the less visible problems of addiction, dealing,
and drug-related crime.
In the face of these statistics, it is not surprising that many
people feel hopeless about the nation's drug problem, leading
them to conclude that "nothing works." Yet the evident lack of
results in this twenty-five year "drug war" reflects not a failure of
resources and will, but rather a failure of policy.
I. THE SUPPLY-SIDE SEDUCTION
Since the early decades of the century, Americans have
viewed drug abuse largely as a foreign problem for which other
countries are to blame. Indeed, at the time the Harrison Narcotic
Act was adopted in 1914, opium was associated with Chinese
immigrants, who were generally thought to be dangerous subver-
sives. Marijuana, which was outlawed in 1937, was linked to
Mexican laborers, who were particularly unwelcome during the
Great Depression. Drug abuse was seen as essentially "un-Ameri-
can," a threat to the social fabric which could best be dealt with
by interdiction and law enforcement. Without foreign drugs, the
thinking went, there would be no domestic problem
This vision has dominated United States drug policy ever
since. The theory is that reduced supplies drive drug prices up,
making drugs more expensive and harder to find. This in turn
will force addicts to seek treatment or to quit on their own. At
the same time, high prices and inaccessibility discourage new
users from trying drugs.
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan put the supply-side theory
to its fullest test. He believed that the nation's borders could ef-
fectively be sealed against the "evil scourge" of drugs in much the
same way Americans could be protected from the missiles of the
"evil Empire" (the former Soviet Union) by the Strategic Defense
Initiative ("SDI"). He also believed drug abuse illustrated that
earlier administrations had been too tolerant. As a result, he em-
tional Academy Press, 1992) (prepared for the Committee for the Substance Abuse Cover-
age Study, Institute of Medicine).
' Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports for the United
States-1992 11, 225 (1993); Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drugs, Crime and the Justice
System 5 (1992).
' See generally David F. Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control
(Oxford University Press, 1987).
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phasized much tougher enforcement of the drug laws and ex-
panded interdiction efforts.1°
In the first year of the Reagan administration, federal spend-
ing for drug enforcement and interdiction jumped 50 percent.11
From 1981 through 1986, funding for drug enforcement more
than doubled-from $800 million in 1981 to $1.9 billion in
1986.12 Attorney General Edwin Meese, head of the National
Drug Policy Board, noted in 1987 that these had been "the larg-
est increases in drug law enforcement funding and manpower in
the nation's history."13
At the same time, the Reagan administration made substan-
tial cuts in demand reduction programs. Total federal funding for
prevention, education, and treatment declined from $404 million
in 1981 to $338 million in 1985; when adjusted for inflation, this
amounted to a reduction of almost 40 percent. 14 Drug abuse pre-
vention and education programs received an average of $23 mil-
lion a year during this period.15
These cuts in demand reduction programs undermined the
basic premise of earlier U.S. drug policy: that a reduction in illic-
it supplies would force addicts into treatment and prevent poten-
tial new users from trying drugs. The Reagan policy no longer
linked supply reduction directly to demand reduction because
treatment was often unavailable for addicts who could not afford
private care.
President Reagan's vision was carried forward by President
George Bush, who allocated 70 percent of the federal drug budget
to supply control.1" Although the U.S. Congress increased pre-
vention and treatment funding in response to the crack cocaine
epidemic, prevention and treatment still received only a third of
total federal funding.17 To date, President Bill Clinton has con-
tinued the enforcement-dominated policies of his predecessors.18
Since 1981, more than $100 billion in federal and state tax dol-
lars have been invested in trying to reduce illegal drug sup-
Mathea Falco, Winning the Drug War: A National Strategy 26 (Priority Press Pub-
lications, 1989).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id at 26-27.
1 Falco, Winning the Drug War at 27 (cited in note 10).
" Id.
16 Falco, Making of a Drug-Free America at 7 (cited in note 1).
17 Mathea Falce, Beating the Next Drug Crisis, World Monitor: The Christian Science
Monitor Monthly 46 (Feb 1990).
"' Michael Kramer, Clinton's Drug Policy is a Bust, Time 35 (Dec 20, 1993).
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plies.' 9 The federal drug budget now devotes almost two-thirds
of all funds to interdiction, foreign control programs, and domes-
tic law enforcement.0
Despite these massive expenditures, heroin and cocaine are
cheaper and more available than ever before. The National Secu-
rity Council ("NSC") concluded in September 1993 that the $1.1
billion spent on interdiction by the military is essentially wast-
ed.21 The General Accounting Office ("GAO") recently conducted
a series of studies that also found that interdiction has not re-
duced domestic drug supplies. 22 Yet there are those in Congress
who argue that even greater resources are needed to stop the
flow of drugs into the country.2 3
As decades of failure suggest, the supply-side theory is fatal-
ly flawed. Additional billions in new supply-side initiatives will
not improve the chances of success for three basic reasons. First,
illicit drug production has become a major worldwide industry,
spreading even to the newly independent Central Asian Repub-
lics.24 Hard drugs produce hard currency and are often the only
reliable export for underdeveloped regions. For example, opium
production in Burma has doubled since 1988, when the military
regime effectively closed the country from legitimate outside
trade.25 As a result, Burma now produces more opium than all
the rest of the world. Moreover, in the past five years, Colombia,
which still dominates the cocaine traffic, has become the world's
second largest opium producer-a direct economic response to the
relative saturation of the U.S. cocaine market. Thus, opium, coca,
and marijuana-the raw materials of the illegal drug trade--can
"o Id. This estimate is based on a Rand Corporation calculation of total drug enforce-
ment expenditures for 1989, which found that state and local governments spent slightly
more than twice as much as the federal government. Federal drug enforcement spending
from 1981 to 1992 amounted to about $35 billion. Assuming the Rand ratio provides a
reasonable measure, total federal, state, and local drug enforcement spending for the peri-
od exceeded $100 billion. Peter Reuter, Hawks Ascendant: The Punitive Trend of American
Drug Policy, 121(3) Daedalus 15, 21 (Summer 1992).
20 Office of National Drug Control Policy ("ONDCP"), 1994 National Drug Control
Strategy: Budget Summary 11 (1994).
2 Michael Isikoff, U.S. Considers Shift in Drug War, Washington Post Al (Sept 16,
1993); ONDCP, Price and Purity of Cocaine 6 (1992).
22 General Accounting Office ("GAO"), DRUG SMUGGLING: Capabilities for Inter-
dicting Private Aircraft Are Limited and Costly 5 (1989). See also General Accounting
Office, DRUG CONTROL: Impact of DOD's Detection and Monitoring on Cocaine Flow 5
(1991).
2 Personal communication with Congressman Glenn English.
24 See generally Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (1993).
2 Id.
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easily be grown in countless places, usually far beyond the con-
trol of governments, police, or armies.
Supply-side initiatives will also fail because, despite its high
rate of drug abuse, the United States consumes a small portion of
worldwide drug production. Experts estimate that twenty square
miles of poppy cultivation would supply the nation's heroin mar-
ket for a year. Similarly, four fully loaded Boeing 747 cargo
planes could meet America's annual cocaine requirements.28
Hence, even if intercepted, these supplies could easily be replaced
from the vast production capacity in many countries.
The price structure of the drug market also undercuts inter-
diction as a viable strategy. The largest profits are made at the
street level, not in foreign poppy or coca fields or on the high
seas. Thus, even if the United States were able to seize half the
cocaine coming from South America-a very unlikely
prospect-street prices would increase by less than 10 percent.27
Alternatively, breaking up open-air drug markets is much more
effective in making drugs expensive and difficult to find-with
the added benefit of making neighborhoods safer."
II. POLARIZATION OF POLICY
While interdiction and source-country programs have been
the focus of our international strategy, law enforcement remains
the dominant approach to domestic drug problems. As a result,
the criminal justice system has been deluged with drug offenders.
In the past decade, arrests for drug crimes more than doubled.29
At the same time, public frustration with escalating drug crime
led to tougher laws, longer sentences, and the death penalty for
major dealers. The most extreme example of this trend occurred
in 1986, when a Detroit judge sentenced a 40-year-old man to life
imprisonment without parole for possession of about two pounds
of cocaine."0 The offender had no previous criminal record, but
Michigan law gave the judge no discretion in sentencing."1 The
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the sentence in 1991, declaring that
the Michigan law was not "cruel and unusual."32
21 See Leslie H. Gelb, Yet Another Summit, NY Times El5 (Nov 3, 1991).
" Peter Reuter, Gordon Crawford, and Jonathan Cave, Sealing the Borders: The Ef-
fects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction ix (Rand Corporation, 1988).
Falco, Making of a Drug-Free America at 86 (cited in note 1).
29 Anita Timrots, Fact Sheet: Drug Data Summary (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
1991).
o Harmelin v Michigan, 501 US 957, 961 (1991).
3' Id at 961 n 1.
32 Id at 996. See Linda Greenhouse, Mandatory Life Term is Upheld in Drug Cases,
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The number of incarcerated drug offenders has doubled since
1985, stretching prisons far beyond capacity.33 Additional pres-
sure comes from parole violators.' Drug abuse is a major factor
affecting parole violations. When parolees test positive for drugs
or miss appointments with their parole officers (often because
they are on drug binges), they are arrested for violating the
terms of parole and are sent back to prison.
The reliance on enforcement in dealing with drug abuse is
costly. Nationwide, taxpayers spend about $20 billion a year
maintaining prisons and jails.35 In California, where the prison
population has quadrupled in ten years, the state now spends as
much on its prisons as it does on all 'higher education.3" Other
states are facing similar crises, with shrinking resources forcing
tough funding choices between social services, education, and
prisons.
The painful lesson from the continuing failure of U.S. drug
policy is that drug abuse is driven far more by demand than by
supply. The answers to America's drug problem are here at
home-in families, schools, and communities-and not in other
countries. The nation's drug strategy will be far more effective
when it begins to build on what we have learned about preven-
tion, education, treatment, and community organization.
III. DEMAND REDUCTION WORKS
What progress has been made in the past decade comes from
reduced demand, which has declined even in the face of readily
available supplies. Marijuana and cocaine use among better edu-
cated Americans has dropped by half since 1986, reflecting the
power of health concerns and negative social attitudes towards
drugs. Smoking has dropped by a third since the middle 1960s,
despite multi billion dollar annual promotional campaigns by the
tobacco industry. Hard liquor consumption has also declined, al-
though more gradually, despite pervasive, sophisticated adver-
NY Times A15 (June 28, 1991).
' General Accounting Office, Drug Treatment: Despite New Strategy, Few Federal In-
mates Receive Treatment 2 (1991).
See Joan Petersilia, Joyce Peterson, and Susan Turner, Evaluating Intensive Pro-
bation and Parole Supervision Programs: Results of a National Experiment (Rand Corpo-
ration, 1991).
" The State of Criminal Justice, an Annual Report 15 (American Bar Association,
1993).
" Personal communication with Andrew Mecca, Chairman of Governor's Policy Coun-
cil on Drug and Alcohol Abuse, on Febuary 2, 1993.
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tising, often aimed at minors for whom alcohol is illegal. Preven-
tion and education are key to these fundamental changes in Am-
erican behavior. 7
In the past decade, promising new prevention programs have
been developed which can reduce new drug use by half and new
alcohol use by a third among early adolescents. 8 These pro-
grams, built on social learning theory, teach children to recognize
the internal and external pressures which influence them to
smoke, drink, and use drugs. They also learn how to resist these
pressures through role-playing in the classroom. The effects of
these programs are much stronger when prevention includes
families, media, and the community in a comprehensive effort to
discourage alcohol, tobacco, and drug use.
The Partnership for a Drug-Free America ("Partnership")
advertising has clearly accelerated negative attitudes towards
illegal drugs, particularly in markets where their ads appear fre-
quently. A volunteer coalition of advertising, media, and public
communications firms, the Partnership began its campaign to
"unsell" illegal drugs in 1987. Since then, it has saturated the
media with messages designed to change normative values to-
wards drugs and drug use. Annual tracking studies on the effects
of the campaign report substantial changes in both attitudes and
drug use, particularly among young teenagers who increasingly
view marijuana and cocaine as very risky and users as foolish.
According to Partnership data, preteen children (age 9 to 12)
have become the most antidrug group in the country. 9
The power of advertising to change attitudes and behavior is
also evident in the recent California offensive against smoking.
Supported by revenues from higher state cigarette taxes, the pro-
gram spends $25 million a year on aggressive antismoking ads
for television, radio, and highway billboards, as well as $55 mil-
lion dollars annually for smoking prevention and cessation pro-
grams. Over a three-year period beginning in 1988, smoking
among California adults decreased by 17 percent.0 (By contrast,
3 See Lloyd D. Johnston, Patrick M. O'Malley, and Jerald G. Bachman, Drug Use
Among American High School Seniors, College Students, and Young Adults, 1975.1992
(National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1993).
' Gilbert J. Botvin, et al, Preventing Adolescent Drug Abuse Through a Multimodal
Cognitive-Behavioral Approach: Results of a 3.Year Study, 58 Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology 437 (1990). See also Mary Ann Pentz, et al, A Multicommunity Trial
for Primary Prevention of Adolescent Drug Abuse, 261 Journal of the American Medical
Association 3259 (June 1989).
Partnership for a Drug-Free America, Media Fact Sheet (Jan 1992). See also
James E. Burke, Breaking a Habit of Mind, Washington Post B3 (Nov 11, 1990).
40 Ron Winslow, California Push to Cut Smoking Seen as Success, Wall St Journal B1
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smoking nationwide has declined by only 5 percent since
1985.)41 If current trends continue, the percentage of Califor-
nians who smoke is expected to decline to 6 percent by the year
2000, compared to 27 percent in 1987.42
Pessimism about society's ability to deal with drugs is deep-
est with respect to treatment. Most Americans do not realize that
treatment works-not always, and often not the first time, but
many people eventually overcome addiction.43 Success rates are
higher for people with stable families, employment, and outside
interests, and lower for those who suffer from serious depression
and anxiety." National studies that have followed tens of thou-
sands of addicts through different kinds of programs report that
the single most important factor is length of time in treatment.'
One third of those who stay in treatment longer than three
months are drug-free a year after leaving treatment." The suc-
cess rate jumps to two-thirds when treatment lasts a year or lon-
ger.47 And some programs that provide intensive, highly struc-
tured therapy report even better results.'
Yet since the early 1980s, treatment has been a low priority
nationwide as drug enforcement has dominated state and federal
spending. In 1991, treatment received 19 percent of the $11 bil-
lion federal drug budget compared to 25 percent ten years earli-
er, well before the cocaine epidemic created millions of new ad-
dicts.49 The impact of this shift is painfully obvious ,in most cit-
ies, where addicts often face waits of six months before they can
get help.5"
In an extensive review of treatment in 1990, the Institute of
Medicine ("IOM") at the National Academy of Science reported
(Jan 15, 1992).
" National Institute on Drug Abuse, National Household Survey at 18 (cited in note
2).
42 Winslow, Wall St Journal at BI (cited in note 40).
" Office of Technology Assessment, The Effectiveness of Drug Abuse Treatment: Im-
plications for Controlling AIDS /HIV Infection 56 (1990).
" Joseph Westermeyer, Nontreatment Factors Affecting Treatment Outcome in Sub-
stance Abuse, 15 American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse 13, 19-21 (1989).
Gerstein and Harwood, Treating Drug Problems at 135 (cited in note 7).
Falco, Making of a Drug-Free America at 110 (cited in note 1).
47 Id.
48 Gerstein and Harwood, Treating Drug Problems at 14-15 (cited in note 7).
" Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"), Budget of the United States Govern-
ment Fiscal Year 1994 47 (1993); ONDCP, 1994 National Drug Control Strategy at 76
(cited in note 20).
"0 See Mathea Falco, The Substance Abuse Crisis in New York City 38 (NY Communi-
ty Trust, 1989).
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that private programs receive 40 percent of all treatment spend-
ing but provide only one quarter of the nation's treatment capaci-
ty.5 Of the six million drug abusers who require treatment, as
many as 4.2 million must rely on public programs.52 Yet only
600,000 publicly funded treatment "slots" are currently avail-
able-which means that fewer than 15 percent of those who need
treatment are able to get it at any one time.
53
Moreover, criminal offenders are more deeply involved in
drug abuse than any other group in the nation. Without treat-
ment, nine out of ten return to crime and drugs after prison, and
the majority are re-arrested within three years.54 Extensive
studies have shown that treatment of drug offenders does
work.55 Therapeutic communities inside prisons reduce recidi-
vism by a third to a half after inmates return to society.56 The
most effective programs are extremely rigorous, demanding far
more from offenders than passive incarceration, and they cost
only $5,000 to $8,000 a year for each inmate.57
Yet treatment for criminals is still very scarce. The GAO
reported in 1991 that only 364 of the 41,000 federal prisoners
who have drug abuse problems are participating in intensive
treatment programs.58 In addition, more than three quarters of
all state prison and county jail inmates are drug abusers-at
least 750,000 offenders-but only 10 percent receive any help.
Furthermore, the GAO concluded that even these numbers are
inflated, since most treatment, which consists of drug education
and occasional counseling, is ineffective.59
Within prisons, priority should be given to treating offenders
with serious heroin and cocaine problems, since they are respon-
sible for the largest proportion of predatory crimes.0 Intensive,
residential drug treatment, which has proven effective in reduc-
ing recidivism among this group, is the most cost-effective ap-
Gerstein and Harwood, Treating Drug Problems at 217 (cited in note 7).
52 Id at 86.
Id at 203-04.
See generally id at 184.
Gerstein and Harwood, Treating Drug Problems at 180 (cited in note 7).
Id.
Id at 177-80, 262.
National Institute of Corrections, Intervening with Substance-Abusing Offenders: A
Framework for Action: The Report of the National Task Force on Correctional Substance
Abuse Strategies (1991).
59 GAO, Few Federal Inmates Recieve Treatment at 18 (cited in note 33); GAO, Drug
Treatment: State Prisons Face Challenges in Providing Services (1991).
' See Gerstein and Harwood, Treating Drug Problems at 102 (cited in note 7).
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proach according to the Institute of Medicine.6 The Institute of
Medicine estimates that there are at least 250,000 prison in-
mates and 750,000 offenders on probation and parole who need
this kind of intensive treatment. 2
Treatment should also be provided for parolees. In 1992, a
Rand Corporation study found that community supervision pro-
grams for offenders on parole or probation-regardless of their of-
fense-usually fail unless drug treatment is provided. ' The
more intensive and structured the treatment, the more likely it is
to be effective. But because the number of treatment programs of
any sort are woefully inadequate, offenders must compete with
noncriminal addicts for limited treatment space. Some cities,
such as Miami, have created special drug courts to provide imme-
diate treatment for drug offenders. These programs have shown
good results, with a treatment cost per offender of less than
$1,000.64
But in most cities, drug offenders do not get treatment, al-
though most would participate if treatment were available.65
IV. POLITICAL IMPACT OF PUBLIC OPINION
Public concern about drug abuse as the "most important
problem facing this country today" fluctuates widely, according to
regular Gallup opinion surveys. In January 1985, before the out-
break of the crack cocaine epidemic, only 2 percent of those inter-
viewed named drugs as the number one problem. By November
1989, drugs had become the predominant concern, named by 38
percent of those polled (compared to poverty, a distant second at
10 percent). But slightly more than two years later (March 1992),
fear of unemployment was paramount, and concern about drugs
had dropped back to mid-1986 levels (8 percent), where it has re-
mained."
Paradoxically, concern about drugs at the community level is
increasing even as national visibility declines. Gallup polls con-
firm this trend, reporting that drugs are viewed as the dominant
61 Id at 189.
62 Id at 235.
Joan Petersilia and Susan Turner, Evaluating Intensive Supervision Proba-
tion IParole Programs: Results of a Nationwide Experiment (National Institute of Justice,
1991).
Falco, Making of a Drug-Free America at 140 (cited in note 1).
Id at 151; GAO, Few Federal Inmates Receive Treatment at 5 (cited in note 33).
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1991 table
2.1 at 172 (1992).
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problem in local schools. 7 At the international level as well, the
vast majority of Americans view "stopping international drug
trafficking" as the nation's top priority." However, the so-called
"influentials" (leaders of business, culture, religion, and finance)
give drug problems very low priority, according to a November
1993 opinion survey by the Times Mirror Company.69 The news
media, foreign affairs leaders, and academics do not mention the
international drug traffic at all!70
Public concern about drugs influences a number of key re-
sponses, both personal and political. For example, while public
concern was increasing to its 1989 peak, negative perceptions of
drugs and disapproval of use were also increasing.71 At the same
time, marijuana and cocaine use fell substantially.72 In short,
heightened public concern appears to be linked to negative per-
ceptions and attitudes which in turn affect actual behavior to-
wards drugs.
Along these lines, Dr. Lloyd Johnston, who conducts the an-
nual Monitoring the Future study, commented on the 1992 in-
crease in LSD and marijuana use: "[Tihe country has been work-
ing its way out of the most serious drug epidemic in its history
because the dangers of drug use were becoming known to our
young people and because society had been speaking loudly and
consistently about its disapproval of drug use. But this must be
an ongoing process if new replacement cohorts of young people
are to get the same message."73
Similarly, surveys suggest strongly that raised awareness of
the problems of drug abuse-and constant high-level warnings,
which President George Bush made the centerpiece of his first
two years in office-may ultimately lead to lowered drug use. The
6' Id table 2.2 at 173.
6 Times Mirror Center for The People & The Press, America's Place in the World: An
Investigation of the Attitudes of American Opinion Leaders and the American Public About
International Affairs 19 (1993).
6 Id.
70 Id.
71 Lloyd D. Johnston, Patrick M. O'Malley, and Jerald G. Bachman, Smoking, Drink-
ing, and Illicit Drug Use Among American Secondary School Students, College Students,
and Young Adults, 1975-1991 8-9 (National Institutes of Health, 1992).
72 Loyd D. Johnston, Patrick M. Omally, Jerald G. Bachman, National Survey Results
on Drug Abuse from Monitoring the Future Study, 1975-1992 table 11 at 74 (National In-
stitutes of Health, 1993).
'3 Loyd D. Johnston, Decline in Drug Use Halts Among American College Students
and Young Adults (University of Michigan News and Information Services, July 15, 1993)
(press release).
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impact appears to be greatest on those most influenced by public
opinion, health concerns, and social disapproval.74
Public concern about drugs also has political effects, stimu-
lating elected officials to move beyond rhetoric to action, particu-
larly in creating larger government programs. From 1986 (the
year when public concern started climbing) to 1989 (the year of
peak concern), the federal drug control budget more than doubled
(from $2.8 billion to $6.6 billion)." Not surprisingly, public opin-
ion regarding the adequacy of government spending "to deal with
drug addiction" mirrors the salience of concern about the issue.
In 1989, 71 percent of the public thought the government was
spending too little; by 1991, that figure had dropped to 58 per-
cent.7"
Despite the decline in public concern, however, public spend-
ing has continued to grow. From 1989 to 1993, the national drug
budget doubled again, and it now exceeds $13 billion.77 This
could suggest political lag time or the impact of community-level
concerns on elected officials.
Public concern about stopping the international drug traffic
strongly affects United States foreign policy. In December 1989,
when Americans were deeply worried about drug abuse as a na-
tional issue, President George Bush authorized the invasion of
Panama and the seizure of its dictator, General Manuel Noriega,
who had extensive links to the Colombian cocaine cartels. The
President justified this intervention in terms of reducing the sup-
ply of cocaine coming into the United States. Four years later,
Noriega is incarcerated in an American prison, after an expensive
and lengthy trial, and the cocaine traffic through Panama has
quadrupled."
The 1993 National Security Council ("NSC") review of the
military's $1.2 billion drug control efforts concluded that interdic-
tion was largely ineffective. Reflecting the power of popular faith
in international measures, however, the NSC recommended shift-
ing $200 million towards programs to strengthen controls in drug
source countries like Peru, Thailand, and Colombia.7" These pro-
"' See generally Philip M. Boffey, U.S. Attacks Drug Suppliers But Loses Battle of the
Users, NY Times Al (Apr 12, 1988).
" See ONDCP, 1994 National Drug Control Strategy exhibit 7-1 at 76 (cited in note
20). 7 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drug and Crime Facts, 1992 28 (1993).
77 ONDCP, 1994 National Drug Control Strategy at 2 (cited in note 20).
7' Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Strategy Report at 172 (cited in note
24).
' Speech by Office of National Drug Control Policy Director Lee Brown (Jan 27,
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grams have not succeeded in reducing the flow of drugs to the
United States in the past. To the contrary, drug production has
increased dramatically despite substantial United States in-
vestments in efforts to establish alternative crops and increase
police enforcement capacities.' Even worse, in some situations
these programs have driven local farmers involved in drug culti-
vation towards insurgent groups, like Peru's Shining Path.s' Yet
despite their continuing failure to produce positive results, these
efforts retain widespread support within the United States. 2
The view that other countries are the source-and solution--of
our drug problem dominates public thinking now as it has for
much of this century.
V. PARADOXICAL PUBLIC RESPONSE
A 1993 survey of 2,500 community antidrug coalitions report-
ed that they would like to see three-quarters of the federal drug
budget allocated to prevention and treatment, compared to the
current one-third allocation." Similarly, nationwide Gallup polls
confirm a strong public preference for prevention and treatment
over law enforcement in dealing with illegal drugs, because re-
ducing demand is viewed as more effective than punishment.'
If the American people support a different approach to sub-
stance abuse, why does policy remain essentially the same? The
inevitable time lag between changing public perception and polit-
ical action is, of course, one explanation for this seeming paradox.
This lag may be particularly pronounced when conflicting con-
cerns are at work, as for example, between the fear of crime,
which encourages enforcement, and the need to reduce addiction.
In November 1993, a New York Times/CBS News Poll reported
that "crime and violence" is seen by 16 percent of those polled as
"the most important problem facing the country today" (compared
to only 1 percent in January of that year).8 5 The November 1993
elections rewarded candidates perceived as "tough" on crime."
1994) (ABA Summit on Crime and Violence, Washington, DC).
'o Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Strategy Report at 1 (cited in note 24).
, See id at 3.
82 Times Mirror Center, America's Place in the World at 19 (cited in note 68).
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Reacting to these trends, the U.S. Senate immediately adopted a
crime bill (after years of stalemate) which authorized $23 billion
for new prisons, boot camps, and additional police officers. 7 Yet
the bill also authorized $1.2 billion for drug treatment, job train-
ing, and alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent drug offend-
ers-a reminder that American voters still believe that punish-
ment by itself will not cure addiction. 8
VI. POLARIZATION OF DEBATE
The polarization of policy-which has continued largely un-
changed since 1981-has also polarized debate. The apparent
failure of law enforcement to solve the nation's drug problems
has led many Americans to demand even tougher enforcement
and more prisons, while others urge that drugs be legalized.
In December 1993, the Surgeon General, Dr. Joycelyn El-
ders, told the National Press Club that legalization deserves
study-the first time a high government official has made such a
suggestion.89 The White House promptly reaffirmed President
Clinton's opposition to legalization.' For Dr. Elders and other
advocates, the heart of the argument is that legalization would
reduce crime and violence. Abolishing criminal penalties for drug
possession and sale would immediately remove hundreds of thou-
sands of offenders from the criminal justice system. Advocates
believe legalization would also eliminate crimes committed to get
money to buy drugs and reduce violent crime associated with
dealing. Moreover, the billions of dollars currently devoted to
drug enforcement could be used for prevention, treatment, and
other social programs. Legalized drugs, they argue, would pro-
vide a major new source of public revenue, which some estimate
could yield as much as $12 billion annually in new taxes.91
Yet, for many reasons, legalization is not the answer. Any-
thing less than unlimited access to drugs would result in an
underground market with its attendant criminal activity. Yet few
advocates of legalization contemplate unlimited distribution. Fur-
thermore, crimes of violence caused by the effects of newly legal-
phant, NY Times B3 (Nov 3, 1993).
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MORE EFFECTIVE DRUG POLICY
ized drugs would probably increase, particularly if crack use,
which produces erratic, violent behavior, becomes widespread.
Proponents of legalization actually recognize that it would
result in increased use.92 One cannot estimate the size of the in-
crease precisely, but patterns for tobacco and alcohol use may
give some indication of the magnitude of the population that le-
galization might produce. About 110 million Americans drink;
fifty million smoke. Deaths attributable to alcohol are estimated
at 100,000 a year; deaths from smoking at 320,000. 93 About
eighteen million Americans have serious drinking problems. 4
Legalization would also signal a fundamental change in
American attitudes, reflecting social acceptance rather than dis-
approval of drug use. For example, legalization would indicate
toleration at the threshold of first use by children, teachers, and
other role models. Because they are illegal and socially unaccept-
ed, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana are generally not used openly
and are more difficult to obtain than tobacco and alcohol. Their
illegality and the negative attitudes about their social use may
have helped keep down the numbers of adolescents who have
sampled them-considerably fewer than those who have tried
alcohol and tobacco. Half the high school seniors surveyed in
1987 reported they tried marijuana, and 15 percent tried cocaine,
but 67 percent smoked cigarettes, and 92 percent tried alcohol.95
The legality and social acceptability of alcohol and tobacco
for adults make these substances sanctioned credentials of matu-
rity that adolescents are impatient to attain. They are also readi-
ly available in society, even with age restrictions on their sale.
Their cost is very low when compared to illegal drugs-in some
states a six-pack of beer costs less than a six-pack of cola.' As a
protection against this easy access, stronger legal barriers are
beginning to emerge: higher drinking-age laws, stricter enforce-
ment of no-sale-to-minor laws, and stringent no-smoking laws.
Id at 88.
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CONCLUSION
The experience of many Western European countries is in-
structive. Even within the context of criminal laws prohibiting
drug possession and sales (except for Spain, the Netherlands, and
Italy, which provide administrative sanctions for possession for
personal use), demand reduction is given priority. Arrest and im-
prisonment are a last resort, reserved for dealers and addicts
who repeatedly reject treatment. Treatment and social services
are readily available, and prevention is the primary strategy for
reducing the spread of drug use.97
In the United States, the current laws provide sufficient flex-
ibility for a major shift away from supply control and enforce-
ment as the dominant policy towards a more comprehensive ap-
proach which emphasizes prevention, education, and treatment.
Law enforcement still has an important role to play, particularly
in helping citizens reknit the fabric-and safety-of their commu-
nities. But the effectiveness of current enforcement policies will
have to' be carefully examined, subject to the same scrutiny as
prevention and treatment programs, so that additional billions of
tax dollars will not be wasted in a futile "war on drugs."
"7 Ed Leuw, Drugs and Drug Policy in the Netherlands, in Michael Tonry, ed, 14
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 229 (University of Chicago Press, 1991).
